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Abstract:
When actors transgress social norms, their social status colors the 
severity with which they are punished. While some argue that high-
status transgressors attract severe punishment when accused of 
ambiguous transgressions, others contend the opposite. In this paper, 
we attempt to reconcile this theoretical inconsistency. We propose that 
the capacity for social status to color third-party judgments of 
transgressions may depend on the status type of high-status actors. 
Drawing on the evolutionary theory of dominance and prestige as two 
alternate forms of status within social hierarchies, we suggest that actors 
associated with dominance-based status will be penalized more harshly 
than actors whose status is based on prestige. Across multiple studies 
employing archival field data, controlled lab experiments, and different 
instantiations of dominance, prestige, and misconduct, we consistently 
demonstrate that high-status dominant actors are punished more 
harshly than their prestigious counterparts. Further, we find that 
attributions of intentionality and lack of moral credentials explain the 
harsher punishments meted out to dominant (versus prestigious) high-
status actors. In this way, we provide both a parsimonious reconciliation 
of the inconsistency in the extant literature and a theoretical explanation 
of how status type of high-status actors differentially impacts the 
judgment, decisions, and behaviors of third parties.
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FALL FROM GRACE: THE ROLE OF DOMINANCE AND PRESTIGE IN THE 
PUNISHMENT OF HIGH-STATUS ACTORS
ABSTRACT
When actors transgress social norms, their social status colors the severity with which they are 
punished. While some argue that high-status transgressors attract severe punishment when 
accused of ambiguous transgressions, others contend the opposite. In this paper, we attempt to 
reconcile this theoretical inconsistency. We propose that the capacity for social status to color 
third-party judgments of transgressions may depend on the status type of high-status actors. 
Drawing on the evolutionary theory of dominance and prestige as two alternate forms of status 
within social hierarchies, we suggest that actors associated with dominance-based status will be 
penalized more harshly than actors whose status is based on prestige. Across multiple studies 
employing archival field data, controlled lab experiments, and different instantiations of 
dominance, prestige, and misconduct, we consistently demonstrate that high-status dominant 
actors are punished more harshly than their prestigious counterparts. Further, we find that 
attributions of intentionality and lack of moral credentials explain the harsher punishments meted 
out to dominant (versus prestigious) high-status actors. In this way, we provide both a 
parsimonious reconciliation of the inconsistency in the extant literature and a theoretical 
explanation of how status type of high-status actors differentially impacts the judgment, 
decisions, and behaviors of third parties.
Keywords: Status, dominance, prestige, punishment, transgression, moral credentials, deviance
Our social landscape is dotted with individuals severely reprimanded for norm and moral 
violations, while others are excused for similar misdeeds. For instance, consider the differential 
fates of Tim Geithner and Tom Daschle, two individuals bestowed with high status, operating at 
the apex of U.S. politics. Geithner played an important role during the 2008 financial crisis when 
he served as the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Similarly, Daschle was a 
well-known figure in the U.S. political circuit who served as the longstanding Senator from 
South Dakota and leader of both the majority and minority Senate. Given their credentials, both 
men were nominated for secretary positions in 2009: Geithner for the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury and Daschle for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Hiebert-White, 
2008; Sahadi, 2008). Around the same time, both were accused of tax fraud for not paying taxes 
on certain incomes and gifts (Staff, 2012). Both Geithner and Daschle described their behavior as 
a mistake and “unintentional” (Brown, 2009; Spak, 2009). However, the parallels between the 





























































two men ended there. Geithner successfully went on to become the 75th United States Secretary 
of the Treasury (Calmes, 2009). In contrast, Daschle was forced to withdraw his nomination for 
the same position (Zeleny & Stout, 2009). In short, both individuals were perched at the top of 
their respective domains, committed virtually identical infractions, and claimed those infractions 
to be unintentional—yet their outcomes were wildly different. 
Similar inconsistencies abound in the corporate world. In 2008, Sam Israel III, hedge 
fund manager at Bayou Hedge Fund Group, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for defrauding 
investors of over $450 million (Weidlich & Glovin, 2008). But in 2011, three Olympus 
executives who covered up $1.5 billion in investment losses—recognized as one of the largest 
frauds in corporate history—successfully avoided serving any jail time at all (Tabuchi, 2013).
In these examples, the transgressors shared a similar level of status; they were ranked at 
the top of their fields and held great influence over others. Yet, some were punished harshly for 
their alleged ethical violations while others were excused. What underlying factors cause similar 
acts of transgression from equally high-status actors to be evaluated differently? Extant research 
across sociology, psychology, and management provides insight as to how a transgressor’s status 
colors observers’ judgments and the punishment exercised on these transgressors (Bowles & 
Gelfand, 2009; Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & Merideth, 2009; Giordano, 1983; Graffin, Bundy, Porac, 
Wade, & Quinn, 2013; Karelaia & Keck, 2013; Loeffler & Lawson, 2002; Polman, Pettit, & 
Wiesenfeld, 2013; Rosoff, 1989; Swigert & Farrell, 1977). Although this extensive work 
successfully demonstrates the critical role of transgressor status in influencing observer 
punishment, it also presents contradictory findings, especially when the transgressor’s status is 
high and the transgression is ambiguous. “Ambiguous transgressions” refer to norm violations 
that are not blatant infractions and leave open the possibility that the act could be perceived as an 





























































honest mistake or an unintentional act (Polman et al., 2013; van Prooijen, 2006). With respect to 
blatant transgressions, findings consistently demonstrate that high-status individuals are punished 
more harshly than low-status individuals for such behaviors (e.g., Karelaia & Keck, 2013; 
Polman et al., 2013; Rosoff, 1989). However, when it comes to ambiguous transgressions, some 
studies find that high status results in greater punishment, others find that high status buffers the 
impact of others’ condemnation for similar misbehaviors (see, e.g., Fragale et al., 2009; Polman 
et al., 2013). In this way, existing research has failed to elucidate why some high-status actors 
are reprimanded for their ambiguous misdeeds while others are excused. Our work aims to 
address this lack of crucial theoretical understanding within the status literature.
We build on the evolutionary social psychology theory of status, which suggests that high 
status can be based on either dominance or prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 
2016). Those whose status is associated with dominance are generally assertive, decisive, and 
controlling in their behavior towards others. The self-assured and confident demeanor of these 
dominant individuals is perceived as a signal of greater competence, which results in them being 
conferred with higher status or leadership positions (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Foti & 
Hauenstein, 2007; Lord, de Vader, & Alliger, 1986). On the other hand, those individuals whose 
status is associated with prestige are respected and admired because of their willingness to share 
their knowledge and skills with others (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001); in exchange for such 
generosity, they are bestowed with higher status (Flynn, 2003; Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & 
Ames, 2006; Willer, 2009). As a result, dominance and prestige are recognized as alternative 
forms of status (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). In this research, 
building on third-party attribution theories (Malle & Knobe, 1997; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004), we 





























































argue that the particular status type associated with a high-status actor (i.e., either dominance or 
prestige) determines whether that actor will be harshly punished for ambiguous transgressions. 
Our research offers several important contributions. First, we provide a theoretical 
rationale for the inconsistent findings of extant organizational research on high-status actor’s 
transgression, and punishment. Second, in resolving this theoretical tension, we offer a more 
nuanced and parsimonious account highlighting the role of two different status types through 
which status yields its benefits and associated costs. Third, our findings are also relevant to the 
retributive justice literature, highlighting how transgressors’ characteristics (e.g., status type) 
influence observers’ desire to punish them. Fourth, our research contributes to the existing 
literature on organizational reputation following misconduct by any key member(s) of the 
organization (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). 
STATUS, ATTRIBUTIONS OF WRONGDOING, AND PUNISHMENT
Status is broadly defined as an individual’s social rank within a formal or informal 
hierarchy, or a person’s relative standing along a valued social dimension (Báles, Strodtbeck, 
Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Pettit, Sivanathan, Gladstone, & Marr, 
2013). A high-status individual, by virtue of his or her ability or knowledge, helps the group to 
attain its goals (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972). Consequently, high-status individuals enjoy 
greater deference from, as well as influence over, those who are positioned lower in the social 
hierarchy (Anderson & Brown, 2010). In other words, status is a property that rests in the eyes of 
others and is conferred to individuals who are deemed to have a higher rank or social standing in 
a pecking order based on a mutually valued set of social attributes (Magee & Galinsky 2008). 
Higher social status or rank grants its holder a host of tangible benefits in both 
professional and personal domains. For instance, high-status actors are sought by groups for 
advice (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980), are paid higher (Wade, Porac, Pollock, & 





























































Graffin, 2006), receive unsolicited help (Van der Vegt, Bunderson, & Oosterhof, 2006), and are 
credited disproportionately in joint tasks (Merton, 1968) and for expressing ideas in the 
workplace (Howell, Harrison, Burris, & Detert, 2015). In innumerable ways, our social 
ecosystem consistently rewards those with high status. 
In addition to these benefits, it has been suggested that high status protects actors when 
transgressing social norms. For example, Hollander (1958) contends that high status affords its 
owner idiosyncratic credits, and that the “positively disposed impressions” (p. 120) in the eyes of 
others allow those with high status to evade sanctions when they deviate from expected norms. 
However, empirical tests of this proposition have been inconclusive. Fragale et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that despite the transgression being ambiguous i.e., when one could also interpret 
the infraction as an honest mistake, high-status actors are punished harshly and assigned greater 
intentionality for the misdeed. These attributions of intentionality explain the harsher 
punishments advocated for high-status actors. Giordano (1983) argues that even small acts of 
deviance by high-status actors are met with greater sanctioning as they are held more 
accountable for their actions than those with low status. Indeed, winners of Financial World’s 
annual “CEO of the Year” competition suffered greater salary loss following unsatisfactory firm 
performance than CEOs who were not the winners (Wade et al., 2006). Another study found that, 
for the same alleged offense, high-status British parliamentarians were subjected to greater 
accountability and sanctioning than low-status legislators (Graffin et al., 2013). Thus, instead of 
being an asset, high status appears to be a liability for those who transgress.
In contrast, Polman et al. (2013) find that high-status actors are punished less than their 
low-status counterparts when the transgression is ambiguous—a set of results contrary to those 
above, but in line with Hollander’s assertion (1958). Likewise, individuals with greater 





























































occupational status are punished less for an ambiguous moderate level of offense, and expected 
to transgress less in the future compared to individuals with low occupational status (Loeffler & 
Lawson, 2002; Rosoff, 1989). An archival study of court sentencing found that for similar 
crimes, high social-status individuals received less harsh punishment and were awarded greater 
numbers of bails, guilty pleas, and lenient convictions than those with low status (Swigert & 
Farrell, 1977). Further, a meta-analysis of jury decision-making found that individuals associated 
with higher socioeconomic status were less likely to be associated with guilty judgments 
compared to those associated with low socioeconomic status (Devine & Caughlin, 2014). In 
short, there is ample empirical evidence that high-status actors are punished less than their low-
status counterparts, especially when the transgression is ambiguous. 
Taken together, the literature to date remains inconclusive and contradictory to the 
punishment handed out to high-status actors following ambiguous transgressions. At times, high 
status seems to benefit the transgressor, affording others a rose-tinted evaluation of their 
misdeeds, while at other times, it hurts the transgressor, inviting a more critical evaluation. 
Hence, in this research, we explore a theoretically grounded explanation for these inconsistent 
findings. Specifically, we examine both when and why high-status actors are punished less versus 
more following ambiguous norm violations. We suggest observers’ interpretation of high-status 
actors’ ambiguous misdeeds depends primarily on whether the actor’s status is one based on 
dominance or prestige.
Theoretical Boundary Conditions
It is important to note the possibility of other factors that could theoretically moderate our 
prediction. For instance, transgressions that benefit ingroup members at a cost to outgroup 
members can attenuate punishment directed towards high-status dominant individuals. In these 
instances, high-status individuals appear more socially engaged and helpful towards the group 





























































(Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012; Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Blaker, & 
Heerdink, 2012). Additionally, the identity of the third-party observer vis-à-vis the high-status 
actor could also influence judgments about the high-status actor’s punishment. Existing work 
highlights that social identity could lead to both the ingroup leniency effect, where the ingroup 
member receives lenient punishment (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), or the “black sheep” effect, 
where the ingroup member is harshly punished (Marques & Paez, 1994). Although these 
boundary conditions are beyond the scope of this investigation, future investigation could 
explore the relevance of these contingency factors. 
THEORY
Dominance and Prestige: Two Alternate Forms of Status
Drawing on the evolutionary theory of social structures that enhance and maximize group 
members’ fitness, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) contend that rank allocation in social 
hierarchies can either be based on dominance or prestige (Cheng et al., 2013; Cheng, Tracy, & 
Henrich, 2010; Halevy et al., 2012; Maner & Case, 2016). Group members who attain and 
maintain high rank by behaving in ways that are assertive, controlling, and intimidating are 
characterized as dominant (Maner & Case, 2016). Such individuals are quick to voice their 
opinions, take control of group decisions, and influence others’ outcomes in an attempt to gain 
superiority over others (Cheng et al., 2013). They are also adept at forming and breaking 
alliances with other members as long as it serves the purpose of preserving their higher rank 
(Maner & Case, 2016). Given their confident and assertive behavior, dominant individuals are 
perceived as competent and granted higher status (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).Their dominant 
attributes are especially valued when faced with inter-group competition, threat, or uncertainty; 
circumstances that often elevate dominant individuals into leadership positions (Halevy et al., 
2012; Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017). In such situations, leaders associated with dominance are 





























































able to enforce coordinated and collective action among group members, thereby increasing 
group efficiency and performance (Laustsen & Petersen, 2015; Van Vugt, 2006). Thus, 
invariably, a high-status dominant actor is a highly agentic member of the group, who is 
assertive, controlling, and decisive (Maner & Case, 2016). Often, dominance overlaps with 
power, in that one has asymmetric control over resources and is therefore able to influence 
others’ actions (Emerson, 1962). Crucially, however, dominance is present with or without 
formal rank authority and can be observed even in groups void of institutional roles; in this way, 
it differs conceptually from formal power relationships (see Cheng et al., 2013 for details). 
As noted, high status can also be based on prestige, conferred to those who are respected 
and admired for their set of skills, knowledge, expertise, and their willingness to share these with 
others (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 2016). Transmission of such valuable social 
information enhances the fitness of other members, who can reliably depend upon the superior 
knowledge and skills of these individuals and maximize their chances of success. Hence, these 
highly skilled and helpful individuals are bestowed with status in the form of admiration, respect, 
or recognition for their skills and cooperation (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 
2016). As a result, “prestige is determined by the perceiver and, as such, necessarily lies in the 
eyes of the beholder” (Maner & Case, 2016: 138). Prestige-based status is similar to the 
reputation construct discussed in sociological and macro literature in that it is dependent on 
others’ deference and approval. Reputation is defined as “the extent to which an organization is 
held in high esteem or regard” (Roberts & Dowling, 2002: 1078), or “the consumer’s subjective 
evaluation of the perceived quality of the producer” (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006: 101). It is an 
expectation based on unobservable quality or other indiscernible traits that are generally difficult 
to quantify but are valued (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Podolny, 1993; Washington & Zajac, 2005). A 





























































typical example of a high-status prestigious leader would be a knowledgeable manager who is 
approached by others for her sound advice or help, or an emeritus professor who is admired and 
respected among other faculty members and sought out for his knowledge and expertise despite 
lacking institutional authority. Given the prevalence of both types of high-status actors in 
leadership positions, it has been theorized that dominance and prestige are two alternate forms of 
status broadly based on two discrete currencies (control versus respect).
Cheng et al. (2013) provide convincing empirical evidence of the above proposition. In 
one experiment, participants completed a task as part of a small group. Following the group 
exercise, participants rated each group member on his or her influence over the team outcome, as 
well as dominance or prestige behaviors associated with that person. Individuals who were 
perceived higher on either dominance or prestige were reported as more influential than others in 
the group but equally influential when compared to each other. Moreover, independent observers 
who viewed team members’ interactions directed their attention (as measured through an eye 
tracker) more frequently towards those who were rated higher on either dominance or prestige 
(Cheng et al., 2013). In another context, an ethnographic study of Tsimane foragers in Bolivia’s 
lowlands found that both dominance and prestige were associated with high status within the 
Tsimane community (von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2010). In summary, there is mounting 
evidence that one’s status can be based either on dominance or prestige (Maner & Case, 2016).
Dominance, Prestige, and Attributions of Wrongdoing
The idea that an actor’s status plays a critical role in others’ judgments, decisions, and 
behaviors towards them is not novel. A growing body of literature speaks to the dynamic rather 
than static nature of social status (Bendersky & Shah, 2013; Hays & Bendersky, 2015; Marr & 
Thau, 2014; Pettit et al., 2013). For example, observers’ status judgments for the same objective 
rank depend on whether the actor has risen or fallen to that rank within a social hierarchy (Pettit 





























































et al., 2013). Likewise, we contend that observers’ judgments of actors’ transgressions are not 
simply colored by the actors’ overall status, but crucially depend on the type of status with which 
individuals are associated—specifically, whether their status is based on dominance or prestige. 
Further, building on third-party punishment literature in organizational and social justice 
research—whereby transgressors’ characteristics influence both the attributions and the resulting 
punitive actions directed towards them (Malle & Knobe, 1997; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004)—we 
argue that observers will ascribe different levels of punishment and intentionality judgments to 
dominant versus prestigious individuals for similar ambiguous misdeeds.
We reason that because individuals with high dominance-based status are associated with 
behaviors focused primarily on preserving their high-status position in the group without taking 
into consideration the goals and aspirations of other group members, their actions would 
generally be perceived as self-serving. Such individuals are also perceived as highly agentic, 
determined, and capable of taking decisive actions in comparison to their prestigious 
counterparts (Halevy et al., 2012; Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; Laustsen & Petersen, 2015). 
Integrating these two aspects of a high-status dominant actor (i.e., being self-serving and 
agentic), we contend that their ambiguous norm violation behavior will be considered 
intentional. Several studies demonstrate that dominant leaders act in ways that maintain their 
higher rank. For example, one study found that dominant leaders tend to ostracize or demote 
talented group members, and further withhold critical information to increase group members’ 
dependence (Maner & Mead, 2010). Moreover, such leaders restrict competent group members 
from bonding with others to reduce potential threats to their leadership position (Case & Maner, 
2014), and even allocate skilled employees to jobs unsuitable for the role (Maner & Case, 2016). 
Thus, stereotypes of dominant leaders being perceived as highly agentic and driven by their 





























































personal goals will influence observers’ judgments when evaluating their ambiguous norm 
violations, such that observers will attribute greater intentionality to their ambiguous misdeeds.
Further, attribution theorists have argued that “those who do negligent harm are judged 
less responsible than those who do intentional harm” (Darley & Shultz, 1990: 533). For instance, 
workers were greeted with more punitive responses when their actions were believed to be 
intentional rather than accidental (e.g., pharmacists filling the wrong prescription or repairmen 
worsening the circuits of a television) (Shultz & Wright, 1985). Similarly, a study investigating 
third-party punishments of norm violations found that intentional transgressions were punished 
more harshly, even at a cost to punishers, compared to identical misdeeds that lacked 
intentionality (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Consistent with this finding, Fragale et al. (2009) 
note that high-status actors are punished more severely for ambiguous transgressions than their 
low-status counterparts are, because their actions are perceived as more intentional. Further 
examination of these findings (Study 2) reveals their status manipulation to be more in line with 
dominance than prestige, as participants rated the high-status actor as more dominant, confident, 
selfish, less timid, and less submissive: attributes generally associated with high-status dominant 
individuals (Cheng et al., 2010; Maner & Case, 2016). These results provide suggestive evidence 
that high-status dominant actors are likely to be punished more than other high-status actors for 
an ambiguous transgression because their ambiguous misdeed is perceived as intentional. 
Accordingly, we predict that increased attributions of intentionality will explain punishment 
directed towards the high-status dominant actors.
In contrast, individuals associated with prestige-based status are keenly sought for their 
advice and expertise and granted higher status for sharing their superior knowledge with others 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Given that this status type is associated with helping others rather 





























































than promoting one’s self-interests, prestigious individuals are perceived as having greater 
positive attributes and being more likeable (Cheng et al., 2010; Maner & Case, 2016). For 
example, in comparison to their high-status dominant counterparts, high-status prestigious 
individuals are seen as more altruistic and cooperative (Halevy et al., 2012), less narcissistic, and 
more ethical, and enjoy broader social acceptability (Cheng et al., 2010). Thus, when accused of 
wrongdoing for an ambiguous norm violation where the transgression could theoretically be an 
honest mistake, individuals with prestige-based status are more likely to be given the benefit of 
the doubt. Observers are likely to judge their actions as less intentional and to not hold them 
accountable (cf. Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). However, it is important 
to note that a simple positive stereotype may not always mitigate the impact of others’ 
evaluation, as violating positive expectations can also lead to harsher punishment (Burgoon, 
2015; Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). We explore this possibility 
in the general discussion part of our paper.
The other-oriented nature of prestige-based status means that it is accompanied by strong 
moral credentials. Moral credentials can serve as one mechanism that licenses norm violation 
behavior, or absolves individuals of such behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010; Monin & Miller, 
2001). These credentials are granted based on one’s virtuous behavioral history such that the 
subsequent norm violation is construed “as if it were not a transgression at all” (Miller & Effron, 
2010: 126). In this way, moral credentials allow others to construe the same ethical transgression 
as more acceptable than when the perpetrator lacks those credentials. For instance, in one study, 
a manager’s ambiguous sexual overtures were not construed as sexual harassment when the 
manager had a history of supporting sexual harassment policies compared to when the behavior 
was unambiguous or such history was absent (Effron & Monin, 2010). 





























































Since, individuals associated with prestige-based status are considered benevolent, 
helpful, and caring, which affords them greater moral credentials and buffers them from 
ambiguous misdeeds. Indeed, Polman et al. (2013) find that, compared to low-status actors, high-
status actors are punished less for ambiguous norm transgression, as their greater moral 
credentials cushion them against others retributive judgments. Notably, an examination of the 
status manipulation employed by Polman et al. (2013) reflects one based on prestige—the 
authors define status as “the respect, prestige, and admiration that individuals enjoy in the eyes 
of others” (p. 615). Thus, in the absence of unassailable evidence, prestigious leaders are given 
the benefit of the doubt because of their accumulated moral credentials and met with less severe 
punishment. 
Similarly, in other studies where status was manipulated using job titles, those with high-
prestige jobs (e.g., surgeon, bank manager, etc.) were punished less in comparison to those with 
comparatively low-prestige jobs (e.g., dermatologist, convenience store clerk, etc.) (Loeffler & 
Lawson, 2002; Rosoff, 1989). Again, these findings provide preliminary evidence in line with 
our theoretical assertion that high-status prestigious individuals are given the benefit of the doubt 
and punished less due to their accrued moral credentials. We therefore expect high-status 
prestigious actors to be punished less severely because of observers’ reduced attributions of 
intentionality and increased perceptions of accumulated moral credentials in comparison to high-
status dominant actors. 
In summary, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1: When accused of an ambiguous transgression, a high-status actor will be 
punished more harshly if the actor’s status is based on dominance rather than prestige.
Hypothesis 2: A high-status actor’s ambiguous transgression will be perceived as more 
intentional if the actor’s status is based on dominance rather than prestige.





























































Hypothesis 3: A high-status actor will be granted greater moral credentials if the actor’s 
status is based on prestige rather than dominance. 
Hypothesis 4: Attributions of intentionality and moral credentials will mediate the 
relationship between actor’s high-status based on dominance or prestige and severity of 
punishment for ambiguous transgression.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
Across three studies (and an additional three in the supplementary document),1 we 
demonstrate how an individual’s status type (i.e., dominance versus prestige) shapes observers’ 
judgments of the actor’s transgressions. In Study 1, we first demonstrate the phenomenon within 
the real-world context of the National Hockey League (NHL) whereby high-status dominant 
players are punished more harshly than their prestigious counterparts. In Study 2, we manipulate 
the group leader’s dominance and prestige behaviors to find that team members punish a 
dominant group leader more than a prestigious leader for ambiguous norm violation. Finally, in 
Study 3, we independently manipulate both dominance- and prestige-based status to test the 
mechanisms behind the differential punishments directed at these leaders. Taken as a whole, our 
work provides a parsimonious account of the nuanced role of dominance- and prestige-based 
status in influencing the judgments and behaviors of third-party punishers. 
STUDY 1
The goal of this study was to demonstrate our phenomenon of interest (hypothesis 1) in a 
real-world hierarchical setting. Specifically, we examined professional ice hockey players in the 
NHL and the minor penalties (punishment) handed down to them for infringing game rules 
(norm violation behavior). Though there are clear rules for awarding minor penalties, the 
judgment is often at the referee’s discretion. Further, the referee must make this judgment in a 
split second after observing the incident from a potentially bad angle and without the benefit of 
video replay. Often minor penalties are incurred by players who have not deliberately committed 
1 See https://osf.io/9na53/ 





























































a foul, highlighting the ambiguous nature of these incidents (Daniels, 2018; Ryan, 2017). 
Additionally, the data we examined was collected after a major penalty rule change in the NHL 
that saw some offenses previously categorized as general penalties (e.g., clipping, charging, 
elbowing, etc.) upgraded to the major penalties category (NHL, 2014). This rule change further 
blurred the boundaries for calling out minor penalties (now based on a smaller set of infractions) 
in the subsequent NHL season. 
Moreover, past research has shown that rule changes initially introduce noise to the 
decision-making process, and this is further compounded when decisions are made under time 
pressure (Edland & Svenson, 1993). Both of these factors—ambiguity in judging a minor penalty 
and time pressure—leave open the possibility for referees’ decisions to be influenced by a 
player’s reputation. In fact, research has shown that referees’ decisions are often influenced by 
players’ or teams’ reputations irrespective of the actual play (Jones, Paull, & Erskine, 2002; Kim 
& King, 2014; Johnston, 2018; Surowiecki, 2016). All of these aspects made the NHL a fitting 
real-world context to test our hypothesis. 
We predicted that over the course of a season, with multiple incidents and decision points 
for referees to hand out minor penalties, the relationship between high-status prestigious players 
and the punishments awarded to them would be negative, whereas the relationship between high-
status dominant players and punishment would be positive. 
Sample
We collected two years of NHL player-season-level data (2014–2016). The NHL season 
consists of 30 teams (23 U.S. and 7 Canadian) with each team playing 82 games, resulting in a 





























































total of 1,230 games. Our data comprised a total of 1,294 observations of player performance in 
a particular season with 756 unique players across the two seasons.2 
Measures
Dependent Variable 
Punishment. We measured punishment using minor penalties accrued by a player over 
the course of a season using penalty in minutes (PIM). PIM is an objective measure of minor 
penalties that indicates the total number of minutes a player was prohibited from taking part in 
the game (i.e., forced to leave the ice), leaving their team “short-handed” on the ice. Since the 
minor PIM data was aggregated at the season level, we normalized it by dividing by the total 
number of games a player participated over the course of a season. 
Independent Variables
The two key independent variables were whether the player’s status was based on 
dominance or prestige. To measure prestige-based status, it was essential to separate it from the 
overall status of the player. Hence, residuals obtained after regressing players’ overall status on 
their performance were used to measure prestige (Apicella, 2014; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). 
Dominance-based status was measured by interacting a physiological marker of dominance with 
a player’s overall status, such that those with high status and the physical marker of dominance 
were considered to possess status based on dominance. Accordingly, we measured overall status, 
prestige, and dominance in this study but our hypothesis was limited to a player’s status based on 
dominance or prestige.
Overall status. Status was operationalized as the current salary a given player was paid, 
as those with higher status are considered more competent and therefore paid more (Idson & 
Kahane, 2000; Vincent & Eastman, 2009). Moreover, salary has been used extensively in the 
2 We did not include goalkeepers, as a goalkeeper is hardly, if ever, awarded a penalty in the NHL.





























































organizational literature as a marker of high status, as competent individuals/high performers are 
generally awarded higher salaries (Barron & Waddell, 2003; Belliveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996; 
Bloom, 1999), especially in the context of professional sports (Harder, 1992; Scully, 1974).  
Prestige. As discussed, prestige is essentially one’s perceived reputation in the group, 
based on others’ respect and admiration for their helpful on-ice play. Thus, we operationalized 
prestige similar to the reputation or deference measure used in past research by accounting for 
(i.e., partialling out) the variance based on a player’s performance from the overall status 
measure, and utilizing those residuals as a measure of others’ respect and deference (Apicella, 
2014; Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Helou & Park, 2001; Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002). 
Each player’s reputation is a function of his objective performance and the intangible 
value he brings to the team by helping others and being a role model—a trait synonymous with 
high-status prestigious actors. To accurately measure prestige, it was thus essential to separate 
objective markers of performance from the unobservable ones (Apicella, 2014; Helou & Park, 
2001; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Sports analysts utilizing big data and high-end analytics 
advocate the use of advanced performance indicators that better capture the nuanced 
contributions made by a player within a team, such as Corsi. Corsi measures the collective 
impact an individual player has on a team by evaluating the scoring opportunities that his or her 
team experiences or the lack of scoring opportunities experienced by the opposing team, when 
the focal player is playing. Corsi is seen as having a better predictive validity in assessing the 
performance of a player compared to other measures of performance, such as goals, assists, or 
goal ratio (Likens, 2011; Macdonald, 2012). We therefore measured NHL players’ past 
performance (i.e., each player’s performance in the previous season) using Corsi.





























































We then regressed each player’s overall status (i.e., salary) for the current year on his past 
year’s performance–Corsi and, controlling for the previous year’s salary, his current salary 
relative to other members in the team and his age (as some players accrue reputation and more 
salary with increased years on a team). The regression residuals of salary obtained after 
accounting for a player’s objective performance, relative salary, age, and previous year’s salary 
were used as an operationalization of prestige. Thus, our measure of prestige was a conservative 
one, as we only captured unobservable factors after partialling out tangible factors that are often 
associated with prestige (e.g., relative salary and age). In short, the status that players were 
afforded beyond their objective performance and relative to others on the team was an indication 
of the intangible value they bring to the team in terms of their prestige.   
Dominance. Following past research (Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; 
Haselhuhn, Ormiston, & Wong, 2015; Mileva, Cowan, Cobey, Knowles, & Little, 2014), we 
measured individuals’ general tendency to be dominant using facial width-to-height ratio 
(fWHR); this is a physiological marker of dominance and not an indicator of whether one’s 
status is based on dominance. We first describe fWHR as our operationalization for generalized 
dominance, followed by how we use fWHR to account for status based on dominance. 
Several studies have shown that greater fWHR is an individual difference among men 
that is associated with both self and other rated trait dominance (Mileva et al., 2014), as well as 
with behaving aggressively (Haselhuhn et al., 2015) or being perceived as aggressive (Carré et 
al., 2009). Studies suggest that men with higher fWHR may possess greater concentrations of 
testosterone (Verdonck, Gaethofs, Carels, & Zegher, 1999), a hormone that directly influences 
dominant tendencies and motivation to enhance one’s status (Mazur & Booth, 1998). Given the 
consistent set of findings that demonstrate a positive correlation between fWHR and trait 





























































dominance, we employed higher values of fWHR as a proxy for general dominant tendencies. 
fWHR is calculated by dividing bizygomatic width (i.e., the widest length of the face) with upper 
facial height (i.e., the length between the upper lip and brow) (Carré et al., 2009). To this end, we 
collected photographs of all players that participated in the 2014–2016 NHL seasons via the 
NHL official website (www.NHL.com) and standardized each image to the same format: 
400X400 pixel size, similar color and intensity of background. Two independent coders who 
were unaware of the hypothesis measured the bizygomatic width and upper facial height of each 
player using an open source software, Image J. There was a high inter-rater agreement for facial 
height ( = .94), width ( = .97), and the overall fWHR ( = .91). 
However, being dominant does not automatically lead to higher status. Rather, our theory 
suggests the effect to be accentuated for those who are dominant and have high status i.e. those 
associated with dominance-based status. Hence, we crossed fWHR with the overall status of the 
player and examined the interaction effect of dominance and status on punishment, such that 
players with high fWHR and high overall status will be punished the most. We contend that the 
higher values of interaction term of fWHR and status captures players with dominance-based 
status as they will typically be the ones associated with dominant tendencies and high status. 
Moreover, we find that salary and player performance were positively correlated, allowing us to 
use salary as a proxy for player performance (b = .24, p < .001). We obtained identical results 
when we used performance (i.e., Corsi) as a measure of status. 
Control Variables 
We controlled for several factors that had the potential to influence our dependent 
variable, PIM. For instance, players’ physical features (e.g., body weight) may result in greater 
punishment (Deaner, Goetz, Shattuck, & Schnotala, 2012). Hence, we controlled for height, 
weight, body mass index (BMI), and age. We also controlled for PIM awarded in the previous 





























































season as a baseline measure of punishment for an individual player. Further, we controlled for 
(1) the position a player plays—forward (center, right wing, or left wing) or defense—as certain 
positions draw more penalties, (2) current performance using the Corsi measure, (3) players’ 
experience, based on the year in which they were drafted, (4) shooting hand of the player, and (5) 
season fixed effects. Finally, we performed multilevel regressions with teams as the higher-level 
factor to partial out any variance due to team-level randomness; for example, some teams may 
prefer to play more aggressively and thus incur greater PIM. Table 1 presents means, standard 
deviations, and intercorrelations among variables.
------Insert Tables 1 and 2 here------
Results
Table 2 presents our multilevel regression results with PIM (punishment) as the 
dependent variable. Model 1 contains all control variables, followed by model 2, which contains 
prestige-based status, after controlling for overall status without any control variables. Model 4 
reports the effect of dominance-based status as an interaction of generalized dominance (fWHR) 
and overall status while controlling for the main effect of both. Models 5 and 6 demonstrate the 
effect of prestige- and dominance-based status, respectively, after accounting for the control 
variables. Lastly, model 7 reports the effect of both prestige- and dominance-based status 
together after accounting for the control variables. In all of these models, we find that prestige-
based status is negatively associated with punishment whereas dominance-based status is 
positively associated with the same. We report results here for model 7, as it includes both 
prestige- and dominance-based status. Prestige-based status was negatively associated with 
punishment (b = -.02, SE = .009, p = .025), while the interaction term measuring dominance-
based status was positively associated with punishment (b = 3.52, SE = .739, p < .001). 





























































On decomposing the interaction, at one standard deviation above and below values of 
status (Aiken & West, 1991), we found that the slope with high values of status was positive and 
significant (b = .80, SE = .15, p < .001), suggesting that high-status dominant players (i.e., those 
with higher generalized dominance coupled with high status) were punished more than those 
with lower generalized dominance (see the supplementary document for the interaction plot1). 
Further, the slope for the interaction between low values of status and generalized dominance 
was also significant but negative (b = -.45, SE = .15, p = .003), implying that those with low 
status and high dominance were punished less than those with low status and low dominance. 
The significant negative slope of the line when status was low was not one of our predictions, but 
warrants further investigation in future research. To directly test hypothesis 1 (i.e., to determine 
whether players with dominance-based status were punished more than those with prestige-based 
status), we compared the regression coefficients of the two. The regression coefficients were 
significantly different, (χ2 = 22.93, p < .001), in support of hypothesis 1.
It is important to note that support for hypothesis 1 might be sufficiently demonstrated by 
examining the main effect of prestige in comparison to dominance, but there can be instances 
when players’ salaries do not efficiently reflect their overall performance. To account for those 
market inefficiencies and to examine parallels with our analysis based on dominance-based 
status, we interacted prestige with overall status and examined its effect on punishment (see 
Models 3, 8, and 9). The interaction effect of prestige and status on punishment was negative and 
significant (b = -.21, SE = .05, p < .001, Model 8). Decomposing the interaction at one standard 
above and below the status values revealed that at high values of status, the slope was significant 
and negative (b = -.06, SE = .01, p < .001), suggesting that as players’ prestige increased, they 
were punished significantly less. The slope at low values of status was positive but marginally 





























































significant (b = .02, SE = .01 p = .10), highlighting that prestige did not mitigate the impact of 
punishment when status was low (see the supplementary document for the interaction plot1). 
Taken together, these results provide strong support for hypothesis 1 in a real-world context.  
Discussion
Using the real-world context of the NHL, Study 1 helps document our phenomenon by 
providing an initial demonstration that high-status dominant actors were indeed punished more 
than high-status prestigious actors. These results present evidence of our central assertion that it 
is not simply the status of the transgressor that colors observers’ judgment, but rather, the type of 
status they enjoy. Notwithstanding the strong evidence in favor of our hypothesis, this study only 
tested and found support for one of the four proposed hypotheses. Despite using minor penalties 
as the dependent variable, it is plausible that the mechanism behind these effects might not be 
based on intentionality or moral credentials. Thus, our inability to measure the psychological 
mediator is a limitation of this study. It is also important to note that we do not suggest that 
referees make their decisions based solely on players’ facial dimensions. fWHR is one of many 
proxies used to capture the dominant tendencies of a player. Additionally, players’ faces may 
sometimes be hidden from the referees, given the helmet and visors that players wear. 
Moreover, one can never completely rule out endogeneity issues in archival studies. 
Despite controlling for a number of variables and employing a conservative approach to our 
measures and operationalization, there is the possibility of other unobservable or unmeasured 
variables confounding our results. Another criticism that could be levied against the current 
study is a need to measure our constructs using validated measures or manipulations of 
dominance or prestige that more precisely capture our variables of interest—that is, the 
interaction between fWHR and overall status may not account for all of the variance associated 
with dominance-based status. Hence, in the studies that follow, we manipulate dominance and 





























































prestige using existing manipulations in the literature to ensure that the operationalization of our 
central variables mirrors the theoretical assertion of the two status types.
STUDY 2
The objective of Study 2 was to replicate the findings from Study 1 by manipulating 
leader behavior either in terms of dominance or prestige, thereby providing greater causal 
evidence. In addition, we wanted to mirror the social interactions within organizations where 
team members interact to resolve a task. We sought to achieve this aim by having individuals 
work within a team to accomplish a clear task—a protocol similar to other experiments designed 
to manipulate status among teams (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Cheng et al., 2013). Specifically, 
we ran a study where participants engaged in a group activity and, unknown to the participants, 
we manipulated the group leader’s dominant or prestigious behavior by bringing in a 
confederate. Following this interaction, participants engaged in an individual task designed to 
examine their reaction towards their group leader after an ambiguous norm violation. In line with 
our hypothesis, we expected participants to take harsher punitive actions against the leader in the 
dominance condition than in the prestige condition. 
Sample and Procedure
Participants. We decided to recruit at least 150 participants to ensure an adequate 
number of participants and groups. Accordingly, 160 participants took part in the study, recruited 
via the behavioral lab of a European business school; however, eight participants did not follow 
the study protocol or were suspicious about the confederate and were removed from the final 
analysis. The final sample consisted of 152 participants (MAge = 30.30 years, SDAge = 12.95, 
57.9% females) of which 73 were in the prestige condition and 79 in the dominance condition. 
These participants were part of 38 distinct work groups that ranged from three to six members 
per group, including the actor. We aimed for at least four members in each group but due to last-





























































minute cancellations, we were left with six groups that included only three members. Our results 
remain identical even if these groups are excluded.
Procedure. To ensure our study was high on both internal and external validity, we ran a 
study protocol similar to Cheng et al. (2013). The protocol consisted of two parts, which we 
discuss in extensive detail below (see Figure S5 in the supplementary document for schematic 
diagram of the study’s protocol)1. In the first part, participants attempted a task individually and 
then performed the same task as a group, which gave them an opportunity to evaluate whether 
their group leader was high in terms of dominance or prestige. The second part of the study was 
carried out in individual cubicles where participants learned about an ambiguous norm violation 
committed by their group leader and were then given an opportunity to punish him (the leader 
was always a male associate acting as a participant). 
Upon entering the lab, participants attempted a “Lost at Sea” task (Nemiroff & Pasmore, 
2001), which required them to rank order 15 items (e.g., a sextant, a shaving mirror, etc.) in order 
of their importance for survival on a deserted boat awaiting rescue. Participants had 15 minutes 
to submit their private rankings. Participants then worked as a group on the same task, where 
they discussed the benefits of each item and submitted one ranking as a group. Before starting 
the group activity, participants were randomly assigned to the role of either a team member or a 
leader using a lottery draw. However, unknown to them, the lottery draw was rigged to ensure 
that the confederate was always chosen as the leader. The confederate was a professional actor, 
who was trained by the experimenters to display typical behavioral cues associated with either 
dominance-based status or prestige-based status (e.g., adapting more expansive postures when 
behaving dominantly as opposed to prestigiously, interrupting and speaking more in the 
dominance condition compared to being helpful and supportive in the prestige condition (Cheng 





























































et al., 2013), modulating vocal pitch by speaking in a deeper tone in the dominance condition 
(Cheng, Tracy, Ho, & Henrich, 2016), etc.). Following the training, the actor participated in 
mock sessions to get comfortable with the role by enacting both behaviors.
After submitting rankings of the 15 items as a group, participants were directed into 
individual cubicles for the second part of the study, which consisted of two stages. In the first 
stage, participants learned about the group leader’s alleged norm violation behavior against 
another anonymized group member. The second stage involved focal participants having the 
opportunity to punish the group leader by assigning him harder questions as part of a general 
ability task. 
In the second part of the study, participants learned that they would either take part in an 
economic game with another participant or attempt a general ability task with an opportunity to 
earn extra money. The general ability task was supposed to start after the economic game and, if 
participants were selected for the general ability task, they would have to wait as another 
participant from the economic game task would be paired randomly with them. To compensate 
for their waiting time, participants had the opportunity to choose the difficulty level of the 
general ability task for themselves and their partner. In reality, all participants were assigned to 
the general ability task and had to wait until the hypothetical economic game between the other 
two participants finished.  
Participants engaged in a filler activity while they waited for the general ability task to 
begin. After completing the filler activity, they read the rules of the supposed economic game 
that took place between the two other group members. It was a dictator game where the offerer 
had the opportunity to split £5 in any way between himself/herself and the receiver. However, 
participants were explicitly informed that the norm was to split the amount equally. Offerers and 





























































receivers would then be paid according to the allocation. Nonetheless, there was a 30% chance 
that a computer algorithm may overrule the offerer’s decision by splitting the amount randomly 
between the two parties. Since the algorithm could potentially decide the final allocation, it 
created a sense of ambiguity around the offerer’s decision. After the final allocation, the receiver 
had the opportunity to comment about his/her interaction with the partner.
Participants then learned about the ostensible economic transaction that happened 
between the offerer and receiver. They learned that the group leader played the role of offerer 
and another group member was the receiver. Participants then read the statement from the 
receiver of the economic transaction about his/her experience in the economic game, which 
stated: “Group leader took less than 5 seconds to decide, kept a substantial amount of money for 
himself, and transferred practically nothing.” This message revealed that the group leader 
violated the norm of splitting the money evenly.
Next, participants started the general ability task and learned they were paired with the 
group leader, who played the role of offerer in the economic game. Participants first attempted 
two trial questions and were informed that solving each question would lead to a reward of £.10. 
The questions required finding two numbers that add up to 10 in a 3X3 matrix within 15 seconds 
(cf. Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). After attempting two trial questions of moderate difficulty, 
participants were given the opportunity to choose a total of four questions for their partner, the 
group leader, from the eight available choices, of which four were easy and four difficult. Similar 
to above, any question answered correctly by the group leader would result in a reward of £.10 
for him. Thus, assigning hard questions to the leader had tangible monetary ramifications for the 
leader. The total number of difficult questions assigned to the group leader was operationalized 
to measure punishment. Participants then rated the group leader on a validated seven-point Likert 





























































scale of dominance and prestige (Cheng et al., 2010), (1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = very 
much; sample item for dominance, “Group leader tried to control other members rather than 
permit them to control him/her,” Dom = .86; sample item for prestige, “Group leader was 
respected and admired by other members”, Ptg = .91). Finally, participants submitted their 
demographic details, received compensation for their participation, and were debriefed.
Results
Manipulation check. Participants reported the group leader higher on dominance than 
prestige in the dominance condition, t(156) = 2.68, p = .008, (MDom = 3.99, SD = 1.25, MPtg = 
3.46, SD = 1.24) and higher on prestige than dominance in the prestige condition, t(156) = 2.68, 
p = .008, (MPtg = 3.76, SD = 1.32, MDom = 3.27, SD = 1.20). These results indicated that our 
manipulation worked as intended. We also inspected whether the leader’s influence was similar 
across the two conditions since both status types should be equally influential (Cheng et al., 
2013). Consistent with past research, we found that there were no significant differences in 
private and group rankings for any of the 15 items (p > .05) across the two conditions, suggesting 
that the leader was equally persuasive and influential in swaying group members’ initial private 
rankings across the two conditions. In short, our manipulation worked as intended.
--------- Insert Table 3 here ----------
Punishment. A one-way ANOVA was significant across the two conditions, F(1,150) = 
4.80, p = .03 (see Table 3), such that the group leader was assigned a greater number of hard 
questions in the dominance condition than in the prestige condition (MDom = 1.86, SD = .75, MPtg 
= 1.60, SD = .70). Since participants were nested within groups, we also performed a multilevel 
regression analysis by coding dominance condition as 1 and prestige condition as 0, with groups 
as the higher-level factor, controlling for the total number of participants in groups and their key 
demographics (age, gender). In support of our hypothesis, we again found that the dominance 





























































condition was significantly correlated with punishment compared to prestige (b = .32, p = .01) 
(see Table S1 in the supplementary document1). Overall, by experimentally manipulating 
dominance and prestige, we found causal support in favor of hypothesis 1.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to replicate the findings of Study 1 by experimentally 
manipulating the dominance- and prestige-based status of a leader. In addition, we demonstrate 
the robustness of our hypothesized effects using a behavioral measure. To ensure greater external 
validity, we replicated these effects within the context of a group activity that mirrored tasks one 
could expect to encounter within an organizational context. By manipulating the leader’s 
dominance or prestige using real groups, this study provides greater assertion of causality. The 
next study tests the psychological mechanisms driving our effects.
STUDY 3
Study 33 was designed to test the two psychological mechanisms of intentionality and 
moral credentials. Additionally, we also wanted to examine if greater dominance (prestige) leads 
to higher (lower) punishment recommendations or an interaction of both. To test these 
possibilities, we manipulated the dominance- and prestige-based status of the focal actor 
independently. Thus, the high-status individual in the scenario was either described as high or 
low on each of the two status dimensions. To further the generalizability and robustness of our 
findings, we employed two scenarios: one directly adapted from prior research where a CEO of a 
Fortune 500 company was accused of tax fraud (Fragale et al., 2009), and the other a recruitment 
scenario involving a senior vice president of a Fortune 500 company (cf. Polman et al., 2013). 
We focused on senior leaders (i.e., CEO or VP) as senior leadership positions are associated with 
3 Three additional studies demonstrate the robustness of our findings by measuring dominance and prestige, ruling 
out alternate explanations of liking, transgressor’s gender, competence, perceived power, and testing the complete 
model (see the supplementary document https://osf.io/9na53/).





























































high status. We then varied the status type by describing the leader as high or low in dominance 
or prestige. 
Method
Participants. We collected a large sample to ensure that we could reliably detect any 
interaction between dominance and prestige. We recruited 498 participants via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), of which three participants were excluded for taking the study more 
than once, and another four were excluded for failing the attention check question. Thus, the 
final sample consisted of 491 participants (51.12% females, Mage = 35.55 years, SDage = 11.30).
Design and procedure. Our study used a between-subjects design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one cell within a 2 (dominance: high (n = 246) versus low (n = 245)) X 2 
(prestige: high (n = 245) versus low (n = 246)) X 2 (scenarios: CEO or VP) matrix. In the high-
dominance condition,4 the CEO or VP (who was male in every scenario) was described as 
controlling and dominating with his colleagues, whereas in the low-dominance condition, he was 
described as not being dominant or controlling. Similarly, in the high-prestige condition, the 
CEO or VP was described as being respected and admired by his colleagues, whereas in the low-
prestige condition, he was described as not being respected or admired. The order of dominance 
and prestige was counterbalanced. Following this, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the two ambiguous transgression scenarios. One scenario was directly adapted from prior 
research (Fragale et al., 2009). Specifically, participants read the following:
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) accused K. Wallace of underpaying the 
federal government on his personal income taxes. Over the past few years, federal tax 
laws have become increasingly complex, and there are now more rules and regulations 
than ever before. Over this same period of time, the IRS has documented a substantial 
rise in improper tax returns. Some are a result of simple mistakes, while others are 
deliberate attempts to pay lower taxes. Although official charges have not been filed 
4 The manipulations were pretested with a different sample; see Study S2 in the supplementary document.





























































against K. Wallace, the IRS alleges that K. Wallace’s tax return understated the amount 
of money that he owed to the federal government.
The other scenario described a senior white vice president in a Fortune 500 company 
overseeing a new recruitment, who did not hire a suitable African American candidate (cf. 
Polman et al., 2013). Specifically, participants read the following: 
Recently, an African American candidate who gave a recruitment interview to Eric Jones 
in response to the job opening advertisement accused Jones of racial discrimination. The 
candidate argued that he had over 10 years of experience and was well suited for the job 
but was passed on because of his skin color. In response, Eric Jones released a statement 
saying there were several well-qualified candidates and he chose the one that was most 
suitable for the job. Although official charges have not been filed against Eric Jones, the 
candidate is exploring legal options for being denied the job.
After learning about either of the two ambiguous transgression, participants responded to 
the following dependent variables. Punishment was measured by asking participants how harshly 
they would punish the actor and whether a legal case should be filed against him ( = .90). 
Moral credentials were measured using a composite of three items assessing how moral, wrong, 
and unethical his behavior was (α = .87) (cf. Polman et al., 2013). Intentionality was measured 
using a single item that asked how strongly participants felt that the behavior was deliberate (cf. 
Fragale et al., 2009). Participants also responded to a single-item manipulation check assessing 
the actor’s overall status. 
Results
Manipulation check. The manipulation check on status worked as intended (F(1,487) = 
6.08, p = .014, ῃ2 =.01). The actor was afforded the highest status when both dominance and 
prestige were high (M = 6.07, SD = 1.19) and least when both were low (M = 4.04, SD = 1.88), 
with intermediate status conferred when either of dominance (M = 5.44, SD = 1.44) or prestige 
was high (M = 5.36, SD = 1.50) (see the supplementary document for further details1). 





























































Punishment. We performed a 2 (dominance: high versus low) X 2 (prestige: high versus 
low) ANOVA with punishment judgments as the dependent variable.5 The actor was punished 
more when dominance was high (M = 3.86, SD = 1.82) compared to when it was low (M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.71, F(1,487) = 15.31, p < .001, ῃ2 = .03, see Table 4). Conversely, punishment was 
significantly less when the actor was rated high on prestige (M = 3.09, SD = 1.70) than low (M = 
4.02, SD = 1.76), F(1,487) = 36.47, p < .001, ῃ2 = .07). We did not observe any interaction effect 
(F(1,487) = .29, p = .60). Since our hypothesis is a comparison of prestige- versus dominance-
based status, we compared the means in the high-dominance low-prestige cell to those in the 
low-dominance high-prestige cell. The means were significantly different such that the actor in 
the former cell was punished significantly more (M = 4.28, SD = 1.79) than the actor in the later 
cell (M = 2.75, SD = 1.59, t(245) = 7.1, p < .001), thus supporting hypothesis 1. 
Intentionality. A similar pattern was observed for attributions of intentionality and main 
effects of both dominance (F(1,487) = 16.10, p < .001, ῃ2 =.03) and prestige (F(1,487) = 43.0, p 
< .001, ῃ2 = .08), but no interaction (F(1,487) = .02, p = .89, Table 3). The transgression was 
considered significantly more intentional in the high- (M = 3.86, SD = 1.95) as opposed to the 
low- (M = 3.19, SD = 1.84)) dominance condition. Conversely, such actions were perceived as 
less intentional in the high- (M = 2.98, SD = 1.77) rather than the low- (M = 4.07, SD = 1.92) 
prestige condition. Further, when comparing the two incongruent cells of high-dominance low-
prestige to low-dominance high-prestige, intentionality was judged to be significantly greater in 
the former cell (M1 = 4.40, SD1 = 1.93, M2 = 2.67, SD2 = 1.66, t(245) = 7.55, p < .001). Overall, 
hypothesis 2 was supported. 
5 We performed a series of three- and four-way interactions, including the order of the transgression scenarios and 
status type along with the two main manipulations for all the reported variables. None of these interactions were 
significant. 





























































Moral credentials. Consistent with our expectations, we observed main effects of both 
dominance (F(1,487) = 4.51, p = .034, ῃ2 = .01) and prestige (F(1,487) = 42.18, p < .001, ῃ2 = 
.08) on moral credentials, but no interaction (F(1,487) = .28, p = .60, Table 3). Participants in the 
high-dominance condition bestowed lower moral credentials (M = 3.78, SD = 1.76) than 
participants in the low-dominance condition (M = 4.11, SD = 1.76). Conversely, participants 
assigned to the high-prestige condition were afforded greater moral credentials (M = 4.44, SD = 
1.73) than participants in the low-prestige condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.66). Comparing the two 
incongruent cells, we find that participants assigned to the high-dominance low-prestige 
condition were afforded significantly less moral credentials than participants assigned to the low-
dominance high-prestige condition (M1 = 3.32, SD1 = 1.63, M2 = 4.64, SD2 = 1.68, t(245) = 6.22, 
p < .001), thus supporting hypothesis 3.
Mediation analysis. We performed bootstrap mediation analysis using structural equation 
modeling by comparing participants’ responses in the high-dominance low-prestige cell with 
those of participants in the low-dominance high-prestige cell. We coded dominance as 1 and 
prestige as 0. Intentionality and moral credentials were included as two parallel mediators and 
punishment as the dependent variable (see Figure 1). A significant indirect effect of dominance 
compared to prestige via intentionality on punishment was observed (b = .86, SE = .17, p < .001, 
95% CI [.56, 1.20]). Further, in comparison to prestige, the indirect effect of dominance on 
punishment via a lack of moral credentials was also significant (b = .56, SE = .14, p < .001, 
95%CI [.32, .89]). The total indirect effect on punishment via the two mediators was positive and 
significant (b = 1.42, SE = .19, p < .001, 95%CI [1.05, 1.79]). After accounting for the indirect 
effect, the direct effect on punishment became insignificant (b = .12, SE = .12, p = .34, 95%CI [-
.12, .35]). Overall, hypothesis 4 was supported. 





























































As an additional analysis, we also examined whether the indirect effect of high 
dominance (prestige) in comparison to low dominance (prestige) was also significant via the two 
mediators. We found that both the indirect effects were significant, suggesting that the two status 
types independently influenced punishment judgments via intentionality and moral credentials, 
such that high dominance (in comparison to low dominance) led to greater punishment while 
high prestige (in comparison to low prestige) resulted in lower sanctioning (see the 
supplementary document for further details1).
-------- Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 here --------
Discussion
By manipulating dominance and prestige, we find that both status types influence 
observers’ punishment judgments, such that greater dominance leads to higher punishment and 
greater prestige results in lower punishment. Further, there was no interaction, suggesting that 
the two status types independently influence observers’ judgments. Importantly, Study 3 
replicated our findings from previous studies and tested the complete model, highlighting the 
pivotal role that attributions of intentionality (Fragale et al., 2009) and moral credentials (Polman 
et al., 2013) play in explaining the harsher punishments meted out to dominant high-status 
actors. Moreover, by including two different transgression scenarios, this study further 
demonstrates the generalizability and robustness of our findings across different contexts.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When high-status actors are associated with ambiguous norm and moral violations, 
predictions of whether they would be punished or not, have to date, been based on very mixed 
evidence. At times, high status appears to attenuate the severity of punishment doled out by 
third-party observers, while at other times, it appears to have the opposite effect. We set out to 





























































reconcile these contradictory findings by investigating why and how the same social marker of 
status can yield such disparate reactions. 
We hypothesized that observer judgments will depend critically on the status type of 
high-status actors—specifically, whether their status is based on prestige or dominance. Across 
three studies (and an additional three in the supplementary document1) that span archival field 
data, lab experiments, and experimental scenarios, we consistently find that for similar 
ambiguous misdeeds, high-status individuals associated with dominance were punished more 
harshly than those whose status was based on prestige. Transgressions of high-status dominant 
actors were perceived as intentional and associated with a lack of moral credentials compared to 
similar misdeeds of high-status prestigious leaders. By conceptualizing and measuring two 
different status type, our research offers a more nuanced and parsimonious account of the vital 
role that status plays in the attributions and punishment others direct towards high-status 
transgressors.
Theoretical Contributions
Our research makes several important theoretical contributions. First, by drawing on the 
two evolutionary bases of social status, our results provide a theoretically sound explanation for 
why ambiguous transgressions of high-status leaders are perceived as more offensive than 
similar misdeeds of other high-ranked actors. In doing so, this work goes beyond the broad 
assessment of having high versus low status, to highlight the importance of status type as a 
critical factor in coloring observers’ assessments of transgression. Our findings imply that 
organizational leaders commanding similar high status may yet have differential exposure to the 
risk of being targeted for ambiguous norm violations.
Second, by discussing two different types of social status (i.e., dominance and prestige) 
rather than simply evaluating on the basis of overall status, our work reconciles inconsistent 





























































findings in the literature. We demonstrate that intentionality and moral credentials are not two 
different psychological accounts for the same phenomenon, but that both these mechanisms 
operate in tandem to influence punishment judgments depending on the transgressor’s status 
type. Furthermore, results from Studies 1 and 3 suggest that high-status dominant actors are 
punished more in comparison to low-status actors, whereas high-status prestigious individuals 
are punished less than low-status individuals. Though it was not the primary aim of this paper to 
examine punishment differences between low-status actors and high-status actors based on 
dominance or prestige, the consistent findings to this effect obtained in Studies 1 and 3 form a 
useful contribution to the status literature. 
Third, we find that ambiguous transgressions by high-status dominant actors are 
perceived as more intentional than those of their prestigious counterparts, which in turn explains 
the harsher punishment doled out to the former. These findings contribute to the research on 
retributive justice (Darley & Pittman, 2003) where reactions to wrongdoings—by jurors in a 
courtroom, by employee supervisors, or by the general public—rely on intentionality judgments 
as the proximal driver of punishment. 
 Fourth, organizational scholars repeatedly call for a stakeholder perspective to the 
governance of firms and the behaviors of those within (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Kochan & 
Rubinstein, 2000). Our research contributes to this dialogue by examining transgressions of high-
status organizational actors from a third party’s viewpoint, a perspective that “has received 
relatively little research attention” in organizational research (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004: 218). 
More importantly, in line with the authors’ theoretical model, we find that transgressor 
characteristics (e.g., status type) influence attributions of blame/intentionality, which then 
mediate the “comeuppances” levied at the transgressor. Moreover, since the third-party observers 





























































were not directly affected by the transgressor’s actions in our tests, our findings suggest that not 
all punitive actions aimed at restoring justice are based on the dominant narrative of self-interest 
(cf. Miller, 1999), but can also be guided by safeguarding normative moral standards.
Fifth, our findings parallel those of McDonnell & King’s (2018) firm-level report, which 
found that prestigious organizations (i.e., those high in terms of both status and domain-specific 
reputation) were less likely to be blamed for a transgression. The authors argued that positive 
expectations associated with such firms lead third-party evaluators to expect that their behavior 
is appropriate when guilt is not established. Notably, although they were theoretically asserted, 
these positive expectations were not explicitly measured. Our findings not only replicate these 
findings at the individual level but also test the mechanism of attributing less blame to 
prestigious actors’ transgressions. However, McDonnell & King (2018) also found that once 
guilt was established for a prestigious organization, it incurred severe punishment; we delve on 
this finding in the section below.
Limitations and Future Directions 
As discussed, a possible limitation of our research could be contingency factors such as 
the nature of the transgression, or observer identification with the high-status transgressor that 
could potentially moderate the main effect of status type on punishment. Further, our findings 
indicate that the greater the moral credentials conferred to those who help, advise, and share 
valuable information (i.e., prestigious leaders), the more these credentials buffer such leaders 
from third-party punishments. A related and parallel finding based on accrued moral credentials 
is that of moral self-licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001). The central findings here are that past 
moral actions liberate an individual (i.e., allow one to grant self-license) to indulge in less moral 
deeds. Thus, if past good deeds by prestigious leaders earn moral credentials, are these leaders 





























































also more vulnerable to indulging in morally questionable behavior in the future due to self-
licensing? This intriguing possibility warrants future investigation.
Our findings paint a rosy picture for high-status prestigious leaders that suggests they 
would be invariably excused for ambiguous transgressions. However, it is plausible that when 
high-status prestigious actors engage in transgressions that are central to their identity or 
antithetical to the process (sharing of skills, knowledge, etc.) that garnered them status, they will 
be punished more harshly. For example, Governor of New York Eliot Spitzer was lauded for his 
dogged fight against sex trafficking and prostitution. When accused of soliciting prostitutes, he 
was therefore subjected to extreme criticism and ridicule, and forced to resign (Hakim & Santos, 
2008). In this way, violating the specific principles that one’s prestige is based on may result in 
perceptions of hypocrisy and harsher judgments, in line with expectancy and stereotype violation 
theory (Burgoon, 2015; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Consequently, such hypocrisy penalty 
might explain our discontent and visceral reactions towards those who are found violating the 
very standards they were once applauded for. The above proposition is in line with McDonnell 
and King’s (2018) firm-level findings where prestigious organizations were reprimanded more 
for transgressions where their blameworthiness was established. 
Our findings are also relevant to the trust repair literature examining reactions to 
competence or integrity-based transgressions (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, 
Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). It is plausible that high-status prestigious actors compared to their 
dominant counterparts would be punished more for violating ethical or integrity-based trust, as 
dominant individuals are expected to behave in such manner and hence tolerated more compared 
to high-status prestigious actors who are not expected to partake in such behaviors. Thus, it 
would be informative to explore how certain type of trust violations may moderate our results. 






























































These results also carry various practical implications. First, in an age of hyper-vigilant 
media, a common challenge for executives is crisis management (Diermeier, 2011; Pearson & 
Clair, 1998). Crises range from corporate fraud to allegations of sexual harassment to 
environmental violations and more. Suddenly, leaders can be catapulted into the media as the 
face of their organization and are expected to manage the situation. For instance, Tony Hayward, 
CEO of BP, was cast into the role of main representative during BP’s disastrous oil spill, and 
was the target of public scorn. Contrastingly, James Burke, CEO of Johnson & Johnson during 
the Tylenol crisis of 1982, was not only forgiven in the court of public opinion but was 
applauded for his handling of the situation. Our findings indicate that these differential public 
reactions could have much to do with how leaders are perceived. Given the differences in 
attributions of intentionality and moral credentials that we assign to dominant versus prestigious 
leaders, it is critical for organizations to evaluate the type of leader they would most prefer as the 
face of the company during a crisis.
Our results also suggest a dominant CEO is more likely to be held accountable for the 
crisis compared to a prestigious CEO. For instance, Nike’s employment practices were subjected 
to huge criticism when it emerged that some managers behaved in a dominant and aggressive 
manner towards their employees. Several employees were reported to have fainted when a 
manager forced them to run multiple laps around the company perimeter as punishment for not 
reaching their production targets. When this news reached the public, it led to a sharp drop in 
Nike’s sales and stock price (Saporito, 1998). In these situations, an obvious solution would be to 
disassociate with dominant CEOs or managers in order to safeguard a firm’s reputation. 
However, in instances where distancing from an accused leader is not a viable option, 
organizations should make sure that they provide timely and appropriate communications 





























































explaining their behavior or apologizing for their conduct. Providing relevant justification and 
apologizing for inappropriate conduct have been shown to reduce backlash against the guilty 
party (Darley & Pittman, 2003). For example, when a white Starbuck’s manager acted 
prejudicially towards a black customer in a store at Philadelphia, in response to the ensuing 
backlash, its CEO apologized, accepted the fault, and voluntarily initiated racial bias training to 
all of its employees across 8,000 stores with a promise to evaluate its impact. This action was 
acknowledged as a positive first step in responding to a misconduct that could have easily 
derailed the company’s sales and credibility (Salmon, 2018). 
Finally, from a policy and legal perspective, these results create a perverse incentive for 
prestigious leaders. If leaders are aware of their prestige, they may be encouraged to hide their 
misdeeds, instead of taking corrective actions, knowing that they are less likely to be held 
accountable. This is an important issue as both these factors—greater incentive to cheat (Harris 
& Bromiley, 2007) and being a member of a prominent and reputable firm—have been 
associated with a greater likelihood of violating moral standards (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & 
Pollock, 2010). Additionally, the tendency to levy different intentionality attributions for similar 
misdeeds based on the transgressor’s status type poses a challenge for policymakers, lawyers, 
and members of juries who seek to impart fair punishment and justice to the violators (see 
Carlsmith & Darley, 2008, for a review). It is imperative that such observers become aware of 
these factors before arriving at a verdict. 
Conclusion
Geithner, despite clear evidence of tax avoidance, rose in the U.S. political hierarchy. 
Daschle, following similar evidence of tax avoidance, suffered a precipitous drop in his political 
career. Our set of studies provides an evidence-based explanation for why two similarly high-
status actors, accused of similar misdeeds, experienced such different outcomes. Further, and 





























































more importantly, by exploring the particular status type associated with a high-status actor 
(dominance or prestige), our findings help to resolve existing inconsistencies in the literature. In 
doing so, we advance our theoretical understanding of when and how the much sought-after 
commodity of status can act as a premium or a liability to its bearer. 
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Table 1  Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-correlations for Study 1
Notes: N = 1294; a Categorical variable, 1= Left hand, 2= Right hand; b Categorical variable, 1= Central forward, 2=Defense, 3=Left Wing, 4=Right Wing; c 
Categorical variable representing the year in which player was drafted includes players from 0=1993 to 21=2014; d Categorical variable, 1= 2013-14, 2=2014-15.
*p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
VARIABLES M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Height (inches) 73.18 2.09 1
2 Weight (kg) 92.19 6.63 0.73*** 1
3 BMI 26.67 1.32 -0.1*** 0.61*** 1
4 Age 27.73 4.27 -0.05 0.1*** 0.21*** 1
5 Shooting Hand a 1.38 0.48 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 1
6 Playing position b 2.25 1.05 -0.04 0.05* 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 1
7 Draft Year c 12.82 5.05 -0.09*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.68*** 0.06* -0.02 1
8 Previous season punishment 0.57 0.49 0.19*** 0.3*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 0.03 0.14*** -0.08*** 1
9 Current Performance -0.65 7.53 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 1
10 Season d 1.5 0.5 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08*** -0.05 -0.05 1
11 Status 2.66 2.11 0.04 0.07** 0.06* 0.29*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.36*** -0.04 0.24*** 0.04 1
12 Generalized Dominance (fWHR) 2.01 0.14 0.06* 0.04 -0.01 -0.09*** -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.06* 0.03 0.02 0.16*** 1
13 Prestige 0 1.24 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.05* -0.07* -0.07** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.59*** 0.08*** 1
14 Punishment 0.56 0.48 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.06* 0.07** 0.12*** -0.04 0.62*** -0.07* 0.01 -0.06* 0.08*** -0.08** 1





























































Table 2  Results of Random Coefficient Modeling in Study 1
PUNISHMENT
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Prestige -.031** -.019 -.018* -.02* -.005 -.012
(.012) (.012) (.009) (.009) (.01) (.01)
Generalized Dominance X Status 2.296* 3.452*** 3.522*** 2.538**
(.964) (.74) (.739) (.887)
Prestige X Status -.195** -.214*** -.119*
(.064) (.05) (.06)
Status .004 .076 .439** -4.339* .018 -6.595*** -6.712*** .421*** -4.609**
(.057) (.075) (.141) (1.844) (.058) (1.415) (1.414) (.11) (1.761)
Generalized Dominance (fWHR) .158* .153 .173* -.036 -.024 .163* .026
(.076) (.111) (.076) (.086) (.086) (.075) (.089)
Height -4.614 -4.455 -4.856 -4.696 -4.129 -4.446
(3.695) (3.690) (3.665) (3.658) (3.665) (3.655)
Weight .054 .053 .057 .055 .049 .053
(.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.034) (.037)
BMI -.163 -.157 -.173 -.167 -.145 -.157
(.129) (.129) (.128) (.127) (.128) (.127)
Age .002 .002 .001 .001 .001 .001
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Shooting Hand a .039 .039 .039 .04 .041 .041
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.022) (.023) (.023)
Playing Position (Central as 
baseline)
  Defender -.007 -.008 -.006 -.007 -.012 -.01
(.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026)
  Left Wing -.005 -.008 -.007 -.009 -.014 -.012
(.032) (.031) (.031) (.031) (.031) (.031)
  Right Wing .039 .035 .038 .034 .036 .035
(.032) (.032) (.032) (.032) (.032) (.032)





























































Previous Punishment .587*** .583*** .592*** .588*** .586*** .588***
(.023) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.023) (.022)
Current Performance -.03*** -.03*** -.032*** -.031*** -.032*** -.032***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Seasons b .033 .043* .03 .041 .04 .04
(.021) (.022) (.021) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Draft Year Dummies c Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 7.652 0.554*** .539*** .238 7.286 8.475 8.107 6.626 7.507
(6.889) (.018) (.018) (.221) (6.880) (6.834) (6.823) (6.834) (6.819)
N 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294 1294
ICC .0076 .0153 .0157 .0158 .0056 .008 .0066 .0075 .0073
Log Likelihood -517.40 -878.41 -873.84 -874.88 -515.35 -506.61 -504.11 -506.19 -502.11
AIC 1108.81 1766.83 1759.67 1761.77 1106.70 1089.22 1086.21 1090.38 1084.22
BIC 1299.93 1792.66 1790.66 1792.76 1302.98 1285.51 1287.66 1291.84 1290.84
Notes: a Categorical variable 1= Left Hand, 2=Right Hand; b Categorical variable 0=2013-14 season, 1= 2014-15 season; c This comprises of 22 fixed effect for 
the year in which a player was first drafted in the NHL; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 3  ANOVA results analysis using number of hard questions assigned as the criterion variable in Study 2
Predictor Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
2 2 95% CI
[LL, UL]
Conditiona 2.526 1 2.526 4.8 .03 .03 [.0, .10]
Residuals 78.95 150 .526
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the 2 95% confidence intervals; a Categorical variable: 0 = Prestige, 1 = Dominance





























































Table 4  Results of ANOVA analysis in Study 3
DV = PUNISHMENT
Predictor Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 2 2 95% CI [LL, UL]
Prestigea 109.74 1 109.74 37.8 <.001 .072 [.034, .119]
Dominanceb 42.58 1 42.58 14.67 <.001 .029 [.007, .064]
Dominance X Prestige 1.32 1 1.32 .45 .50 .001 [0, .014]
Residuals 1413.74 487 2.90
DV = INTENTIONALITY
Predictor Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 2 2 95% CI [LL, UL]
Prestigea 150.18 1 150.18 45.47 <.001 .085 [.044, .135]
Dominanceb 52.71 1 52.71 15.96 <.001 .032 [.008, .07]
Dominance X Prestige .003 1 .003 .0 .98 .000 [0, .000]
Residuals 1608.34 487 3.30
DV = MORAL CREDENTIALS
Predictor Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 2 2 95% CI [LL, UL]
Prestigea 127.14 1 127.14 44.79 <.001 .084 [.043, .134]
Dominanceb 13.08 1 13.08 4.61 .03 .01 [.000, .033]
Dominance X Prestige 1.16 1 1.16 .41 .52 .001 [0, .014]
Residuals 1382.46 487 2.84
Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the 2 95% confidence intervals; a Categorical variable: 0 = Low, 1 = High; b Categorical variable: 0 
= Low, 1 = High; 











































































Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients; a Direct effect of IV on DV after accounting for the two indirect effects; 
* p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; 
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